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Introduction
It is empirically well established that …rms' mark-ups behave countercyclically and that …rms' pro…ts behave pro-cyclically 1 . Several recent studies show that accounting for …rm dynamic and endogenous mark-ups movements 2 helps in improving the performance of DSGE models in several directions and is consistent with empirical evidence.
A model featuring frictions in the product market raises questions on the appropriate design of optimal monetary policy. Time-varying wedges in the form of endogenous mark-up movements and oligopolistic competition induce signi…cant welfare costs that might call for deviating from price stability policies. In this paper a DSGE model with oligopolistic …rms and …rms'adjustment costs on pricing a'la Rotemberg 1982 is used to answer this question. Firms in the model engage in oligopolistic competition: this leads to endogenous variations in mark-up even in the ‡exible price case 3 . Speci…cally monopolistic mark-ups depend on …rms market share: an increase in the number of …rms, increases competition and demand elasticity, therefore reduces mark-ups. Timevarying monopolistic rents reduce output below the e¢ cient level and induce ine¢ cient ‡uctuations in employment and consumption. Those elements induce a trade-o¤ for the monetary authority between reducing the cost of adjusting prices and smoothing ine¢ cient ‡uctuations in output.
The design of optimal policy follows the Ramsey approach (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976, Lucas and Stokey 1983, Chari, Christiano and Kehoe 1991) in which the optimal path of all variables is obtained by maximizing agents'welfare subject to the relations describing the competitive economy and via an explicit consideration of all wedges that characterize both the long run and the cyclical dynamics. Recent studies apply this approach to the analyses of optimal policy in the context of models with nominal and real rigidities 4 .
In the present model, oligopolistic competition introduces three types of time-varying wedges. 1 Krugman 1979 analyzes the role of …rms dynamic in an open economy model. Rotemberg and Woodford 1992, 1995 …nd that collusion can generate countercyclical mark-ups. Other contributions on the study of oligopolistic models in macro include Horstein 1993, Gali'1994, Chatterjee and  Cooper 1993, Devereux, Head and Lapham 1996. 2 Ghironi First, …rms' monopolistic mark-ups induce a time-varying wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour and the marginal productivity of labour. Because of this output and employment are ine¢ ciently low and the monetary authority is tempted to increase the number of varieties and to reduce mark-ups, by increasing demand. In this respect consumer in ‡ation can be used to smooth and reduce …rms'monopolistic rents and to boost demand. Second, there is an intra-temporal wedge on the evolution of …rms'values, as the number of new entrants is dampened by the increase in monopolistic rents of the existing …rms. This wedge distorts the allocation of consumption between two di¤erent dates. Once again the policy maker would like to use consumer price in ‡ation to boost consumption demand. Finally, nominal rigidities and increasing return to scale interact to induce a third type of time-varying distortion. Due to increasing return to scale, when the number of varieties increases the price of each variety increases relative to the price of the consumption basket. When …rms face adjustment costs on producer prices, increases in producer price in ‡ation act as sales taxes. This creates a bias for the policy maker toward PPI stabilization rather than CPI stabilization. Overall analytical and quantitative (the economy is simulated under productivity and government expenditure shocks) results show that the Ramsey planner deviates form full consumer price stabilization for all types of shocks considered.
To provide a full assessment of optimal monetary policy design the analysis compares welfare costs of alternative monetary policy rules. Welfare in this context is computed using second order approximations methods 5 which, in models with large distortions, allow to account for the e¤ects of volatilities on mean welfare. Furthermore we consider conditional welfare metrics, which allow to account for the transitional dynamic from one policy regime to the others. Results show rules placing high weight on PPI in ‡ation rather than CPI in ‡ation are welfare improving. Second, rules targeting mark-ups perform better than rules responding solely to in ‡ation. This is so as this allows to reduce the distortion caused by the oligopolistic wedge. Third, asset price targeting, in terms of lean against the wind policy, is welfare enhancing. Firms'rents a¤ect the evolution of asset prices and through this they distort the intertemporal allocation of consumption between two di¤erent dates. For this reason it is welfare enhancing to target asset prices. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the Ramsey plan. Section 4 discusses the welfare costs of alternative monetary policy rules. Section 5 concludes.
Model Economy
At each point in time the economy is populated by a continuum of identical households with mass one. The representative households has preferences over consumption and leisure. Households choose consumption, c t ; labour hours, h t ; and investment in risk free bonds, b t ; and …rms shares,
x t . They receive labour income, returns on bonds, dividends and capital gains on …rms share.
Consumption in this economy is given by the following Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:
with N h;t being the number of …rms operating into the economy at time t which is given by:
and evolves according to:
with % being an exogenous destruction rate. The optimal allocation of expenditure on each variety yields:
where:
is the consumer price index (CPI). There is continuum of agents who maximize the expected lifetime utility. They choose the set of processes fc t ; h t ; b t ; x t g 1 t=0 to maximize:
subject to the following budget constraint (in nominal terms):
and to (3). In the above equations v t is …rms' share value, d t is …rms' dividends, (1 + r n t 1 ) are nominal returns on risk-free bonds, W t are nominal wages, t are nominal …scal transfers. First order conditions to the above problem read as follows:
Equation (8) is the classical Euler condition with respect to risk free bonds. Equation (9) is the optimal investment condition with respect to …rms'share and describes the evolution of …rms' share value. Finally equation (10) is the optimality condition with respect to labour hours. We can solve forward equation (9) to obtain an expression of the asset price as discounted sum of future
Future dividends, d s ; are given by …rms'pro…ts which in oligopolistic models can be written as a function of number of …rms operating in the market and demand elasticity, (N h;t ; "):
Notice that, as in large part of the recent literature, money plays the role of nominal unit of account 7 . The assumption of a cashless economy implies that zero in ‡ation will be an outcome in the long-run. Departure from price stability occurs in the short run as the monetary authority responds to productivity and government expenditure shocks in order to reduce the impact of oligopolistic externalities.
Firms'Optimization under Flexible Prices
Let's start by analyzing …rms' behavior under ‡exible prices. This analyses is instructive as it highlights to what extent endogenous variations in mark-up are due to oligopolistic competition and to sticky prices. Firms'produce variety i using labour hours according to the following production function:
where z t is an aggregate productivity shifter. Firms face the following demand for variety i :
with y c t = c t + g t being aggregate demand. Firms engage in oligopolistic competition and maximize the following (nominal) pro…t function:
Under strategic pricing the e¤ect of a change in prices on demand can be decomposed as follows:
Overall the e¤ect on demand of a change in the price of each variety can be written (after substituting (16) into (15)):
where i = p i y i p c y c is …rm's i market share. Importantly demand elasticity in this context depends on …rms'market share. Using equation (17) we can solve …rms'pro…ts optimization and obtain the following …rst order condition:
By solving (18) we obtain the following optimal price:
Firms' mark-up, ( i ) = (1 i )" (1 i )" 1 ; here depends on market share. As i goes to zero the mark-up tends to = " " 1 and the model nests the monopolistic competition case: Let's de…ne " i = (1 i )" : market power goes up when the demand elasticity for variety i, " i ; decreases. In a symmetric equilibrium all …rms charge the same price p i = p so that p c = (N ) 1 1 " p :Therefore the expression for the market share becomes:
and the optimal price can be written as follows:
Hence the optimal mark-up depends countercyclically on the number of …rms operating in the economy at time t: As the number of …rms increases, the degree of competition increases and the mark-up decreases. Importantly notice that di¤erently from Bilbiie et al. 2007 the mark-up depends on the number of …rms even when …rms are homogenous. The existence of a mark-up in this context is in fact related to the fact that …rms engage in oligopolistic competition rather than to …rms heterogeneity.
Let's now examine the role of endogenous mark-up variations for business cycle ‡uctuations in a competitive equilibrium. By rewriting condition (21) in terms of CPI index and by imposing labour market equilibrium, we obtain the following:
Equation (22) shows that the mark-up, (N t ; "); represents a wedge on the condition equalizing the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and labour productivity. This has two consequences. First, in this environment, any shock transmitted to the economy is ampli…ed by endogenous mark-up variations in a way that tend to amplify employment variability. This is the sense in which Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) 
Firms'Optimization under Sticky Prices
Let's now assume that …rms face quadratic costs on price adjustment, { i t ; as in Rotemberg 1982:
with g t being exogenous government expenditure, and where can be thought as the sluggishness in the price adjustment process: as ! 0 prices become ‡exible. Such cost induce a sticky price adjustment.
It is important to recall that under price stickiness and even in absence of strategic pricing, mark-up vary in response to shocks. Consider a shock that increases demand: as prices adjust slowly …rms must adjust mark-ups to make the optimality condition to hold. In the context of the present model mark-ups vary in response to shocks because of both price stickiness and oligopolistic competition. As shown in Jiaimovich and Floteotto 2004 the ampli…cation obtained through countercyclical mark-ups movements can reproduce the volatilities of output and employment found in the data without requiring implausibly large productivity shocks. Let's de…ne the relative price as:
Firms'per period pro…ts in this case are given by:
Firms in this case choose a sequence of prices, fp i t g 1 t=0 ; to maximize the expected future sum of discounted pro…ts:
Firms'optimization delivers the following optimality conditions:
with:
From equation (28) in ‡ation depends on the number of …rms in the market through the demand elasticity. Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz 2007b have shown that the dependence of in ‡ation on the number of …rms, a state variable, helps in explaining part of observed in ‡ation persistence.
Firms'pro…ts and asset values
After imposing a symmetric equilibrium and after substituting for the aggregate demand relation,
wt zt ; and the resource constraint,
…rms pro…ts read as follows:
Given …rms'pro…ts, …rms'asset value is obtained using equation (11) . Recall that the number of …rms in the economy evolves according to
The number of …rms that enter each period the oligopolistic market, N e;t ; is determined through an entry condition. To enter the market …rms have to pay a …xed entry costs, f e;t ; which can be written as z t h e;t ; where h e;t is the number of hours employed to set up new …rms. The entry condition equates the value of a …rm to the entry cost and reads as follows:
Aggregate Equilibrium Conditions
Aggregate output in this economy is given by:
Aggregate accounting in this economy implies:
Due to increasing returns to scale CPI and PPI in ‡ation are di¤erent t. It is useful to de…ne the PPI/CPI ratio:
Risk free bonds and …rms'share are in zero net supply. Finally the equilibrium in the labour market implies:
and states that total labour supply, h t ; must equalize the number of hours demanded to open new …rms plus the number of hours demanded to run production in the existing …rms.
Optimal Ramsey Policy
The optimal policy plan is determined by a monetary authority that maximizes the discounted sum of utilities of all agents given the constraints of the competitive economy. The next task is to select the relations that represent the relevant constraints in the planner's optimal policy problem. This amounts to describing the competitive equilibrium in terms of a minimal set of relations involving only real allocations, in the spirit of the primal approach described in Lucas and Stokey 1983. There is a fundamental di¤erence, though, between that classic approach and the one followed here, which stems from the impossibility, in the presence of sticky prices and other frictions, of reducing the planner's problem to a maximization only subject to a single implementability constraint. Khan, King and Wolman 2003 adopt a similar structure to analyze optimal monetary policy in a closed economy with market power, price stickiness and monetary frictions, while Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2002 to analyze a problem of joint determination of optimal monetary and …scal policy.
The consumers'optimality conditions for this economy can be summarized as follows:
where: ! t = (N t ) given by (34) and the condition ! t = t wt zt . Notice that the government resource constraints is not included among the equilibrium conditions as …scal policy is passive due to the absence of distortionary taxation. De…nition 2. Let n t = f 1;t ; 2;t ; 3;t ; 4;t ; 5;t ; 6;t g 1 t=0 represent sequences of Lagrange multipliers on the constraints, (35),(36),(37), (38), (39),(40). Then for given stochastic process fa t ; g t g 1 t=0 , plans for the control variables n M in f n t g 1
t=0 M ax f n t g 1
subject to (35) , (36) , (37) , (38) , (39) ,(40).
Non-recursivity and Initial Conditions
As a result of constraints (35) and (37) (35) and (37) respectively, bear the crucial meaning of tracking, along the dynamics, the value to the planner of committing to the pre-announced policy plan. Another aspect concerns the speci…cation of the law of motion of these lagrange multipliers. For in this case both constraints feature a simple one period expectation, the same co-state variables have to obey the laws of motion:
Using the new co-state variable so far described the state space of the Ramsey allocation is ampli…ed as follows fa t ; 1;t ; 3;t g 1 t=0 and a new saddle point problem is derived which is recursive in the new state space. Consistently with a timeless perspective, the values of the three co-state variables are set at time zero equal to their solution in the steady state.
Planner Solution and The Role of Wedges
Before turning to the quantitative properties of the Ramsey plan, both in the long run and in response to shocks, it is instructive to consider the comparison between the planner solution and the competitive economy. The planner solution is obtained by maximizing agents'utility under the resource constraint, the equation for the evolution of the number of …rms, and by assuming ‡exible prices. Such plan delivers the pareto optimal allocation. The comparison between our distorted competitive economy allocation and the e¢ ciency conditions associated with the planner solution will highlight the role of distortions and time-varying wedges in this model. The planner problem is this model can be described as follows:
subject to (39) and:
Let´s de…ne as t and t the Lagrange multipliers associated, respectively, with constraints (44) and (39) . After taking …rst order conditions of the planner problem and after some manipulations, we get the following pareto e¢ ciency conditions:
where (N t ) = (1 Under sticky prices the monetary authority can a¤ect the real allocation and abate the welfare costs of wedges. As the monetary authority is endowed with a single instrument and faces multiple wedges, it will have to trade-o¤ among them. The mechanism through which the monetary policy a¤ects wedges runs as follows. First, notice that the competitive economy allocation under sticky prices, described by equations (35) reducing in ‡ation and mark-ups. This will increase …rms' pro…ts and the number of entrants in the industry. The increase in the number of new …rms will increase labour demand and will push employment toward the pareto e¢ cient level. To highlight the transmission mechanism at work in this case, lets'consider the following entry condition:
For given entry cost, f e;t , an increase in demand can increase total …rms discounted pro…ts, d s ; in the market, which in turn, increases the number of …rms in the market, N t ; and reduces mark-ups, t : Recall, from condition (47), that a fall in …rms' mark-ups induces an increase in employment.
Optimal Policy in the Long Run
Optimal monetary policy in the long run amounts at setting the rate of in ‡ation to which the policy maker would like to converge. To develop an analogy with the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, this amounts to computing the modi…ed golden rule steady state. To determine the optimal in ‡ation rate in the long run, one needs to solve the …rst order conditions of the Ramsey plan in the steadystate. In particular the …rst order condition with respect to in ‡ation is su¢ cient to determine the long run optimal level of in ‡ation. Taking …rst order conditions with respect to in ‡ation of the plan described in (41) delivers:
After imposing steady state the condition above becomes:
Since 4 > 0; 6 > 0 (the constraints must hold with equality), > 0 (I are not imposing a priori that the steady-state coincides with the ‡exible price allocation), equation (50) implies = 1 or a zero average (net) in ‡ation rate. Recall, by equations (33) , that = 1 implies c = 1: The intuition for this result is simple. Under commitment, the planner cannot resort to ex-post in ‡ation as a device for eliminating market ine¢ ciencies. Hence the planner chooses the in ‡ation rate that allows to minimize the cost of adjusting prices, 2 ( t 1) 2 .
Optimal Response to Shocks
Let's now analyze the dynamic properties of the Ramsey plan in a calibrated version of the model.
Technically I compute the stationary allocations that characterize the deterministic steady state of the …rst order conditions to the Ramsey plan. I then compute a second order approximation of the respective policy functions in the neighborhood of the same steady state. This amounts to implicitly assuming that the economy has been evolving and policy been conducted around such a steady already for a long period of time. Calibration is set as follows:
Preferences. The discount factor, ; is set to0:99; so that the annual interest rate is equal to 4 percent. Both the elasticity of consumption, ; and the Frish elasticity, ; are normalized to one, while the elasticity of labour supply, ; is set to 3. Results are robust to alternative parameters.
Technology. Following Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz 2007 the elasticity of product variety, "; is set to 3.8 and the …rms'destruction rate, %; to 0.025. Finally the adjustment cost parameter, ;
is set to 70. This parameter is varied in the simulations to test robustness.
Shocks. The model is simulated under productivity and government expenditure shocks which follow AR(1) processes. Persistence and volatility of the productivity shocks are calibrated as in the RBC literature, a = 0:95 and a = 0:008. government consumption evolves according to the following exogenous process, ln gt g = g ln g t 1 g + " g t ; where the steady-state share of government consumption, g; is set so that g y = 0:25 and " g t is an i.i.d. shock with standard deviation g . Empirical evidence for the US in Perotti 2004 suggests g = 0:0074 and g = 0:9. In response to government expenditure shocks, …gure 2, optimal monetary policy implies a fall in consumption and in the price level. This is consistent with the …ndings of Khan, King and Wolman 2003 8 . In order to generate a fall in consumption the government increases the nominal interest rate and this also implies a fall in the price level. Overall deviations from price stability are rather small for this shocks alone, a result in line with previous literature (see Khan, King and Finally, …gure 3 shows that the optimal volatility of in ‡ation, under both productivity and government expenditure shocks, decreases when the elasticity of demand increases (the mark-up decreases). This is so since higher elasticity implies that the market is more competitive and …rms' monopolistic rents are lower. The lower the mark-up, the higher the aggregate demand and the closer is the economy to the pareto e¢ cient allocation. This implies that with higher elasticity the monetary authority has lower incentive toward active policies and the use of state contingent in ‡ation subsidies.
Welfare Analysis Under Alternative Rules
Most central banks follow explicitly of implicitly Taylor type rules, hence a comprehensive analysis of the role of monetary policy in a model with product market frictions requires a welfare comparison across di¤erent monetary policy rules. For this comparison I consider the following class of rules:
where represents a response to CPI in ‡ation rate, y the response to output and r the degree of interest rate smoothing. I therefore consider three alternative targets for the variable x t ; CPI in ‡ation, mark-up and asset prices. For the three variables the parameters in the monetary policy rules are respectively, cpi ; mu ; ap 9 : The literature on optimal policy has stressed the role of producer price in ‡ation for price stability policies, on the other side central bank usually target consumer price in ‡ation. As in this model the two in ‡ation rates follow di¤erent dynamics and are a¤ected by di¤erent wedges, it is appropriate to asses whether a welfare based ranking of rules would assign di¤erent weights to the two. Since the main wedge in this economy is given by monopolistic rents, mark-up is also a natural candidate as monetary policy target. Finally, the reason for considering asset prices stems from the fact that …rms'rents a¤ect the evolution of asset prices, therefore distort consumption allocation between two di¤erent dates. The monetary authority might therefore want to smooth this intra-temporal wedge.
Before turning to the results some observations on the computation of welfare in this context are in order. First, one cannot safely rely on standard …rst order approximation methods to compare the relative welfare associated to each monetary policy arrangement. Indeed in an economy with a distorted steady state stochastic volatility a¤ects both …rst and second moments of those variables 9 All coe¢ cients apart the ones on in ‡ation rates are divided by four to make the rule compatible with a standard Taylor rule at annual frequencies. that are critical for welfare. Hence policy arrangements can be correctly ranked only by resorting to a higher order approximation of the policy functions 10 . Additionally one needs to focus on the conditional expected discounted utility of the representative agent. This allows to account for the transitional e¤ects from the deterministic to the di¤erent stochastic steady states respectively implied by each alternative policy rule 11 . De…ne as the fraction of household's consumption that would be needed to equate conditional welfare W 0 under a generic interest rate policy to the level of welfare f W 0 implied by the optimal rule. Hence should satisfy the following equation:
Under a given speci…cation of utility one can solve for and obtain:
= exp
The model economy is simulated under two sources of aggregate uncertainty, productivity and government consumption shocks. The table below report results 12 :
First, the best rule is the one that targets mark-ups alongside with PPI in ‡ation and with an interest rate smoothing of 0.9. This rule allows the policy maker top strike an optimal balance 1 0 See Kim and Kim (2003) for an analysis of the inaccuracy of welfare calculations based on log-linear approximations in dynamic open economies. 1 Responding to the interest rate allows to smooth ine¢ cient ‡uctuations in asset prices, which in this context arise because of monopolistic rents. Finally responding to asset prices is welfare improving compared to a standard Taylor rule that responds to PPI in ‡ation and output or compared to strict in ‡ation targeting.
Conclusions
This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a DSGE model with sticky prices and product market 
